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Deferential Review of an Administrative Agency's
Decision in Federal District Court:
International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago
Karen L. Vinzant
I. INTRODUCTION
The City of Chicago, like municipalities throughout the country,
has an ordinance that provides for the designation and protection of
historical landmarks.' The city's Landmark Ordinance is administered
by the Commission on Chicago Historical and Architectural Landmarks
(the Commission). Pursuant to the Illinois Administrative Review
Law2 , judicial review of final decisions of a municipal landmarks
commission lies in the state circuit court. In InternationalCollege of
Surgeons v. City of Chicago, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a lawsuit filed in the Circuit Court of Cook County
seeking judicial review of the Chicago Landmarks Commission can be
removed to federal district court, where the case contains both federal
constitutional and state administrative challenges to the Commission's
decisions.'
In July, 1988, the Chicago Landmarks Commission made a
preliminary determination that seven buildings on Lake Shore Drive
met the criteria for landmark designation set out in the Chicago
Landmarks Ordinance.4 These elegant mansions are all that remain of
the fashionable residences that were built at the turn of the century,
when many of the city's wealthiest person's, led by entrepreneur Potter
Palmer, moved to Lake Shore Drive from the increasingly industrial

See Chicago Municipal Code, Art. XVII §§ 2-120-580 to 2-120-920. The Chicago
Landmarks Ordinance creates the Commission and establishes its procedures for designating
properties as Chicago Landmarks.
2 111.Comp. Stat., ch. 735, §§5/3-103, 5/3-104 (Supp. 1997).
3
International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 91 F.3d 981 (7th Cir. 1996),
Rev'd, 118 S.Ct. 523 (1997).
4 Id. at 985.
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Prairie Avenue on the city's south side.5 The Landmarks Commission
voted to recommend to the City Council that the seven buildings
receive landmark designation and, on June 28, 1989, the Chicago City
Council passed the "Seven Houses on Lake Shore Drive District
Ordinance" (the "Designation Ordinance") designating the landmark
district.6 The "Seven Houses on Lake Shore Drive District" thus fell
under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Chicago Landmarks,
which has authority under the city's Landmarks Ordinance to grant or
deny permits for the demolition or alteration of landmark buildings.7
Two of these seven buildings are owned by the Illinois College
of Surgeons ("ICS") and its U.S. section.8 ICS is a 14,000 member
nonprofit organization dedicated to the advancement of surgery and
education of surgeons worldwide.9 The Edward T. Blair House, a fourstory mansion at 1516 Lake Shore Drive, was designed by William
Kendall of the New York architectural firm of McKim, Mead & White
and completed in 1914.0 The Eleanor Robinson Countiss House,
which lies adjacent to the less spacious Blair House, was completed in
1917." Its architect, Howard Van Doren Shaw, modeled the house
after the Petit Trainon, a three-story Versailles mansion built in 1770
for Louis XV's paramour, Madame de Pompadour (Shaw added a
fourth floor).' 2 ICS maintains offices in the Blair House and operates
the "International Museum of Surgical Science" in the Countiss
House.' 3 Through a contract of sale of the houses to Robin
Construction Corporation ("Robin"), a co-plaintiff, ICS hoped to

5 International College of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 1995 WL 9243 (N.D.Ill.)

at 1.
6

Id.

See Chicago Municipal Code, §§ 2-120-580 to 2-120-920. The Chicago
Landmarks Ordinance creates the Commission and establishes its procedures for designating
properties as Chicago Landmarks.
8 1995 WL 9243 (N.D.IIl.) at I.
7

9 Id.

10 Id.
I' Id.
12 Id.
13

Id.
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realize a return of $17 million.14 ICS sought permits to demolish the
rear, side and coach house portions of the properties so that Robin
could build a 41-story mixed use condominium tower on the site,
leaving only the front facades of the original structures.' 5
The Commission denied the Illinois College of Surgeons'
permit applications. t6 The Illinois College of Surgeons then filed
actions in state court under the Illinois Administrative Review Law for
judicial review of the Commission's decisions, alleging, among other
things, that the two ordinances and the manner in which the
Commission conducted its proceedings violated the Federal and State
Constitutions, and seeking on-the-record review of the Commission's
decisions.' 7 The City of Chicago removed the suits to federal district
court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.' 8 The District Court
consolidated the cases, exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the
state law claims, and granted summary judgment for the City, ruling
that the ordinances and the Commission's proceedings were consistent
with the Federal and State Constitutions and that the Commission's
findings were supported by the evidence and not arbitrary and
capricious.' 9 The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded to state court,
ruling that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction of a case containing
state law claims for on-the-record, deferential review of local
administrative action.20 The United States Supreme Court subsequently
held when reversing the Seventh Circuit that a case containing claims
that a local administrative action violates federal law, but also
containing state law claims for on-the-record, deferential review of
administrative findings, can be removed to federal district court.2 '

14 Report of Proceedings Re: Economic Hardship Exception Hearing ("Hardship

Hearing Record"), at 34.
15 1995 WL 9243 (N.D.I1l), at 2.
16

Id.

17

1995 WL 9243 (N.D.IlI.), at 2.

18

Id.

19 Id. at 32.
20

91 F.3d at 994.

21

118 S.Ct. 523 (1997).
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II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 10, 1990, ICS applied to the Commission for four
permits that would allow ICS to demolish the coach houses and the side
and rear portions of the Blair and Countiss houses.22 The Commission
gave the permits preliminary disapproval on October 23, 1990, and
conducted a public hearing on December 18, 1990.23 The four
demolition permits received the Commission's final disapproval on
January 9, 1991.24
ICS then filed its first complaint in the Circuit Court of Cook
County (No. 91 CH 1361); it sought judicial review of the
administrative decision to deny the permits.25 The City removed this
complaint to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois, where it was docketed as No. 91 C 1587.26 Pursuant to §2186 of the Landmark's Ordinance, ICS also filed an application seeking
an economic hardship exception to the Landmarks Commission's denial
of the demolition permits.27 The Commission held a public hearing on
March 5, March 7, and May 8 of 1991.28 The Commission concluded

22 Id.

23 Chicago Municipal Code, Ch.2-120 §740. The Commission should issue a
"preliminary disapproval" of an application of such a permit if the Commission finds the
proposed work will "adversely affect or destroy any significant historical or architectural
feature of the improvement or the district or is inappropriate or inconsistent with the
designation of the structure, area, or district, or is not in accordance with the spirit and
purposes of the ordinance"; §800. If an informal conference does not result in an accord or
if one is not requested, the application goes to a public hearing before the Commission, which
then issues a written decision, containing findings of fact, approving or disapproving the
application.
24 Id. at §810; 735 ILCS 5/3-101. The written decision is a final administrative
decision appealable to the state court under the Illinois Administrative Review Law. The
Commission's regulations governing demolition permit applications in landmark districts call
for the agency to evaluate whether the property sought to be demolished contributes to the
character of the district. Rules and Regulations of the Commission on Chicago Landmarks,

Art. IV(C) 51).
See supra note 24.
26 91 F.3d at 985.
27 Chicago Municipal Code, Ch.2-120 §830. If the Commission makes a final
decision to deny any permit, the applicant may ask the Commission for an "economic hardship
exception" on the basis that the denial will result in the loss of all reasonable and beneficial use
of or return from the property.
28 1995 WL 9243 at 2.
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that its denial of the demolition permits had not resulted in the "loss of
all reasonable and beneficial use of or return from the property" - the
standard that appears in the Landmarks Ordinance.29 On July 3, 1991,
the Commission issued its final written denial of an economic hardship
exception.30 ICS then filed its second complaint in the Circuit Court of
Cook County (No. 91 CH 7289) seeking judicial review of the
administrative decision to deny the economic hardship exception. 3
Again, the City removed the action to the federal district court, where
it was docketed separately as No. 91 C 5564.32 Because the property is
also governed by the Lake Michigan and Chicago Lakefront Protection
Ordinance, the College was required to obtain approval for its proposed
development under that ordinance as well. 33 The Chicago City Council
rejected ICS's application for permits under the Lakefront Protection
Ordinance, and ICS filed a "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and
Other Relief' in the district court, where it was docketed as No. 91 C
7849. 34
The United States District Court, Northern District, consolidated
the three cases and stayed case 91 C 7849 (the declaratory judgment
action) pending disposition of the other cases.35 The district court
exercised federal question jurisdiction over ICS's federal claims, and
recognized that it could also exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
ICS's state law claims.3 6 In a memorandum opinion dated January 10,
1992, the court dismissed with prejudice several of ICS's equal
protection and due process claims, including the claim that the
Landmarks Ordinance effected an unconstitutional "taking" of ICS's

29

Rules andRegulations of the Commission on Chicago Landmarks, Art. V(A)( 14). The application for an economic hardship carries the burden of proving by clear and
convincing evidence "that the existing use of the property is not economically infeasible and
that the sale, rental or rehabilitation of the property is not possible, resulting in the property not
being capable of earning any reasonable economic return."
30 1995 WL 9243 at 2.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 1995 WL 9243 at 2.
36 Id.
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property.37 Several claims remained, including ICS's claim that the
Designation Ordinance violated ICS's federal and state equal protection
and due process rights by unfairly treating the subject properties
differently from other properties with respect to landmark status.3" In
their First Amended Consolidated Complaint for Administrative
Review, ICS sought review of the Commission's decisions, and raised
several state and federal constitutional challenges.39 The challenges
were raised against the Constitutional validity of the city's ordinance
governing the designation and preservation of landmark buildings (the
Landmarks Ordinance), its ordinance designating the ICS property as
a landmark building (the Designation Ordinance), and the
Commission's application of the Landmark's Ordinance to the ICS
property.4" On December 30, 1994, the district court applied Illinois
law which grants the trial court the power to affirm or reverse the
administrative agency in whole or in part, noting that the decision must
be made on the basis of the administrative record.4 ' On January 9,
1995, the district court affirmed the Commission's decisions and
entered summary judgment for the City. 42 Having reached this
conclusion, the court dismissed case 91 C 7849 with prejudice as moot
and with leave to reinstate if the court's judgments were vacated,
reversed, or remanded on appeal.43 ICS filed a notice of appeal in all
three cases.44
On August 1, 1996, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded the suit, stating that claims for
administrative review require the state court to proceed on the basis of
more deferential review of the state agency's decisions. 45 Removal of
the action would require the district court to perform the appellate role

37 Id. at 3.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 1995 WL 9243 at 2.
41 Id. at 3.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 32.
44 91 F.3d at 981.

45 Id.
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46
with respect to the decision of the state administrative agency. Since
the state proceeding could not be termed a "civil action," it could not
be removed.47 The City petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
writ of certiorari.48

Il.

THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT

The United States Supreme Court considered two issues: (1)
propriety of removal for federal constitutional claims raised by way of
a cause of action created by state law, namely the Illinois
Administrative Review Law; and (2) supplemental jurisdiction for state
law claims that require on-the-record review of a state or local
administrative determination.49
A. Removal to FederalDistrictCourt of an Administrative Decision.
1. State law claims may be properly removed for federal
constitutionalclaims raisedby way of a cause ofaction createdby state
law.
As a general matter, title 28 of the U.S. code provides
defendants the right to remove to the appropriate federal district court
"any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of
the United States have original jurisdiction."50 The propriety of
removal thus depends on whether the case could originally could be
filed in federal court. 5 Congress granted original jurisdiction to federal
district courts primarily under 28 U.S.C. §1331: "The district courts
have original jurisdiction under the federal question statute over cases
arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."52
It is long settled law that a cause of action arises under federal law only
when the Plaintiffs well-pleaded complaint raises issues of federal

46

(1987).

Id. at 994.

47 Id.
48 118 S.Ct. at 528,529.
49 Id.
50 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
51 Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 2845-2846
52 28 U.S.C. §133 1.
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53

ICS's state court complaints raised a number of issues of federal
law in the form of various federal constitutional challenges to the
Landmarks and Designation Ordinances, and to the manner in which
the Commission conducted the proceeding. While the federal
constitutional claims were raised by way of a cause of action created by
state law, namely, the Illinois Administrative Review Law, its claims
still "arise under" the laws of the United States because its well pleaded
complaint established that its right to relief under state law requires
resolution of a substantial question of federal law. 5" The Supreme
Court cited Howard v. Lawton for the proportion that constitutional
issues may be raised in claims seeking administrative review." The
Lawton court noted that requiring separate trials for the review of the
administrative body's decision and the test of constitutional validity of
the statute that brought on the decision would lead to piecemeal
litigation. 56 By raising claims that arise under federal law, ICS
subjected itself to the possibility that the City would remove the case
to the federal courts.
2. A state law claim requiring on-the-record review of an
administrativeaction is removable as a civil action.
ICS argued that the District Court was without jurisdiction over
its actions because they contain state law claims that require on-the record review of the Commission's decisions.5 7 A claim that calls for
deferential judicial review of a state administrative determination, ICS
asserts, does not constitute a "civil action ...
of which the district courts

(1987).

53 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 107 S.Ct. 1542,1546
54
Franchise Tax Bd.Of Cal. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust for Southern

Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 7-12, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2845-2848 (1983).
55 118 S.Ct. at 529.
56
Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill.2d 331, 175 N.E.2d 556 (1961). Lawton dealt with an
action for administrative review of a decision of the zoning board of appeals of the city of
Chicago upholding the refusal of the city's zoning administrator to grant a building permit an
denying an application for installation of trailer facilities in a trainyard as a special use. The
superior court of Cook County affirmed the board's decision and upheld the constitutionality
of the zoning ordinance. In its opinion, the court noted that the trial court's review extends to
all issues raised in an administrative proceeding.
57 118 S.Ct. at 525.

Spring 1998

Federal Deferential Review of State Agency Decisions

121

of the United States have original jurisdiction" under 28 U.S.C.
§1441(a). (emphasis added).58 The Supreme Court found that the
relevant inquiry is not, as ICS asserts, whether its state claims for onthe-record review of the Commission's decisions are "civil actions"
within the "original jurisdiction" of a district court. The district court's
original jurisdiction derives from ICS's federal claims, not its state law
claims.59 Those federal claims suffice to make the actions "civil
actions" within the "original jurisdiction" of the district courts for
purposes of removal.6" The Court of Appeals, in fact, acknowledged
that ICS's federal claims, if brought alone, would be removable to
federal court.6 ' Nothing in the jurisdictional statutes suggests that the
presence of related state law claims somehow alters the fact that ICS's
complaints, by virtue of their federal claims, were civil actions within
the federal courts' original jurisdiction.
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction.
1. The Districtcourt could exercise supplementaljurisdiction
over the state claims once the case was removed on federal question
grounds.
Pendent and ancillary jurisdiction are principles by which the
federal courts' original jurisdiction carries with it jurisdiction over state
law claims that derive from a "common nucleus of operative fact," such
that " the relationship between the federal claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises
but one constitutional case."62 Congress has codified these principles
in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, which combines the doctrines
of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction under a common heading in 28
U.S.C. §1367. The statute provides, "in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Id. at 526.
59 Id.
60 U.S.C. §1441(a).
61 91 F.3d, at 993.
62 Mine Worker's v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
58

XVIII

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges

122

Constitution."63 That provision applies with equal force to cases
removed to federal court as to cases originally filed there; a removed
case is necessarily one that the district courts have original
jurisdiction. 6
Once the case was removed, the District Court had original
jurisdiction over ICS's claims arising under the federal law, and thus
could exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims so
long as those claims constitute "claims that form part of the same case
' The Supreme Court found that the District
or controversy."65
Court was
correct in its determination that the claims for review of the
Commission's decisions are legal "claims" in the sense that the term is
generally used in the context to denote a judicially cognizable cause of
action.66 The state and federal claims derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact, namely, ICS's unsuccessful efforts to obtain
demolition permits from the Chicago Landmarks Commission. 67 That
is all the statute requires to establish supplemental jurisdiction. 68 ICS
seemed to recognize as much in the amended complaint it filed it filed
with the District Court following removal, stating that the nonfederal
claims are subject to this Court's pendent jurisdiction.69
2. State law claim requiring on-the-record review of
AdministrativeAction as a Civil Action.
The essential premise of ICS's argument is that Sec. 1367(a),
which presupposes a "civil action" of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction is inapplicable.7 ° The Supreme Court explained
that ICS in fact raised claims not bound by the administrative record (its
facial constitutional claims), and the facial and as-applied federal
constitutional claims raised by ICS "arise under" federal law for

63

28 U.S.C.§1367(a).

64 28 U.S.C. §1441(a).
65

118 S.Ct. at 530.

66

Id.

67

Id.
U.S.C. §1367(a).
Appellate Record p. 143.
Brieffor Respondents 15-21.

68
69
70
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purposes of federal question jurisdiction.7 ICS suggested not only that
a claim involving deferential review of a local administrative decision
is not a "civil action" in the "original jurisdiction" of the district courts,
but also that such a claim can never constitute a claim "so related to
same case
claims ... within original jurisdiction that it forms part of the
72
jurisdiction.
supplemental
of
or controversy" for purposes
The Supreme Court found nothing in the text of U.S.C.
§1367(a) that indicates an exception to supplemental jurisdiction for
claims that require on-the-record review of a state or local
administrative determination.73 Instead, the statute generally confers
supplemental jurisdiction over "all other claims" in the same case or
controversy as a federal question, without reference to the nature of the
review.74 Congress could, of course, establish an exception to
supplemental jurisdiction for claims requiring deferential review of
state administrative decisions, but the statute, as written, does not bear
that construction. The ICS Court noted that neither Supreme Court
decision on which ICS principally relies, Chicago,R.1 & P.R. Co. v.
Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 74 S.CT. 290 (1954), and Horton v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 81 S.Ct. 1570 (1961), require that an
equivalent exception be read into 28 U.S.C. §1367(a).75
Both Stude and Horton, to the extent that either might be read
to establish limits on the scope of federal jurisdiction, address only
whether a cause of action for judicial review of a state administrative
decision is within the district court's original jurisdiction under the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. §1332, not whether it is a claim within the
district courts' pendent jurisdiction in federal question cases.76 Both
Stude and Horton indicate that federal jurisdiction generally
encompasses judicial review of state administrative decisions.77 In
Stude, a railroad company challenging the amount of a condemnation
71118 S.Ct. at 531; see New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New
Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 372, 109 S.Ct. 2506,2520-2521 (1989) ("a facial challenge to an
allegedly unconstitutional ... zoning ordinance is a claim which we would assuredly not require
to be brought in state courts.").
Id.
73 Id.

74 Id.
75 Id. at 532.
76 Stude at 346 U.S. at 581, Horton at 367 U.S. at 348.
77 Id.
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assessment attempted to establish federal jurisdiction by two separate
routes.7" First, the railroad filed a complaint seeking review of the
amount of the assessment in federal court on the basis of diversity
jurisdiction, and, second, it filed an appeal from the assessment in state
court and then undertook to remove that case to federal court.79 As to
the action filed directly to federal court, the Supreme Court upheld its
dismissal, finding that state eminent domain proceedings were still
pending and that the complaint thus improperly attempted to "separate
the question of damages and try it apart from the substantive right from
which the claim arose."' ICS emphasized the Court's observation in
this interlocutory context that a district court "does not sit to review on
appeal action taken administratively or judicially in a state
proceeding."'" The ICS Court noted that the Stude Court did not mean
by this remark that jurisdiction turned on whether judicial review of the
administrative determination was deferential or de novo.82 The decision
makes no reference to the standard of review.
The ICS court went on to state that ICS's reading of the Stude
court's statement to suggest that federal courts can never review local
administrative decisions would conflict with the court's treatment of the
second action in the case: the railroad's attempt to remove its state court
appeal to federal court.8 3 With respect to that action, the Court held that
removal was improper in the particular circumstances because the
railroad was the plaintiff in the state court action.84 But the Court
observed that, as a general matter, a state court action for judicial
review of an administrative action is "in its nature a civil action and
subject to removal by the defendant to the United States District
Court."85 If anything, then, Stude indicates that the jurisdiction of
federal district courts encompasses ICS's claims for review of the
Commission's decisions. Horton, to the same effect, held that a district
court had jurisdiction under the diversity statute to review a state
78 Stude at 346 U.S. at 582.
79 Id.
80 Id.

81 Id. at 346 U.S. at 581.
82 118 S.Ct. at 532.
83 Id.

84 Stude at 346 U.S. at 578-579.
85

11
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worker's compensation award.86 The bulk of the opinion addresses the
central issue in the case, whether the suit satisfied the amount-incontroversy threshold for diversity jurisdiction. 87 But the plaintiff
alleged, based on Stude, that diversity jurisdiction was lacking because
the action was an appeal from a state administrative order, to which the
Court simply responded that, aside from many other relevant
distinctions which need not be pointed out, the suit was a trial de novo,
and not an appellate proceeding.8 8 The Court in Horton did not purport
to hold that the de novo standard was a precondition to federal
jurisdiction.89 The ICS Court noted that any negative inference that
might be drawn from that aspect of Horton, would be insufficient to
trump the absence of indication in 28 U.S.C.§ 1367(a) that the nature of
review bears on whether a claim is within a district court's
supplemental jurisdiction.'
District courts routinely conduct deferential review pursuant to
their original jurisdiction over federal questions, including on-therecord review of federal administrative action.9" Nothing in 28
U.S.C.§1367(a) suggests that the district courts are without
supplemental jurisdiction over claims seeking precisely the same brand
of review of local administrative determinations.
CONCLUSION

ICS raised claims not bound by the administrative record (its
facial constitutional claims), as well as facial and as-applied federal
constitutional claims "arising under" federal law for purposes of federal
question jurisdiction. Claims involving deferential review of a local
administrative decision remain "civil actions" in the original
jurisdiction of the district courts, as set forth in 28 U.S.C. §1331. These
claims constitute claims "so related to claims ..." within such original
jurisdiction that they form the same case or controversy for purposes
of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1367. The federal court

86 Horton at 367 U.S. at 352.
87 Id. at 367 U.S. at 352.
88 Id. at 367 U.S. at 354.
89 Id.

90 118 S.Ct. at 533.
91 See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105-107 (1977).
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may properly review such state claims even though deferential on the
record review of administrative finding is required.9" Such review is,
after all, similar to federal court deferential review of federal
administrative agency actions. 93

92 118 S.Ct. 533. The dissenters, Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, dispute this point

but the opinion for the court alleges that it is unclear why the dissent does so. The dissenting
opinion indicates unease with the court's construction of "civil action" to permit cross-system
appellate review of local agency decisions. 118. S.Ct. 539.
93 1 18 S.Ct. at 533.

